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A major characteristic of financial markets is information asymmetry.  To combat its 
problems principals can use screening.  That is, they can offer the clients a menu of contracts 
and infer their risk level from their choices.  If the pattern of choices that clients with different 
risk level make differs, there is self-selection of clients and screening occurs.  We conduct an 
experiment to address an important question for such settings—does the framing of the 
offered menu of contracts interfere with the self-selection of clients?  The answer is yes.  In 
fact, subjects’ choices shift when the same (positive) outcomes of the same menu of contracts 
are presented in two different frames.  Since both frames differ in the ―perceived‖ reference-
point, we propose a theoretical approach that initially follows Prospect Theory to explain our 
results.  Subjects exhibit loss aversion in their perception and assessment of the positive 
outcomes below the reference-point, and self-selection fails to occur. 
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Self-selection in risky financial decision-making: An 
experiment on framing and “perceived loss” aversion 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Would you offer your apartment (where you are living in with your family) as 
collateral for an investment project?  Consider now a slightly different frame: 
Would you get a mortgage to buy an apartment?  The difference between the 
first and the second question is the reference point: In the first question you are 
endowed with the apartment. 
A large number of experimental studies, within economics and psychology, 
support that individuals decision-making differ depending on the reference they 
are given
1
.  The reference-dependant approaches [see Thaler (1980))], and most 
prominently the Prospect Theory [Kahneman & Tversky (1979); Tversky & 
Kahneman (1992)] have gained widespread success in economics and decision 
research.  In contrast with more conventional economic approaches, in which 
the possible outcomes of available choice options are valued in absolute terms, 
as the Expected Utility Theory, reference-dependant theories are based on the 
idea that outcomes are always evaluated relative to some relevant reference 
point. 
In this paper, we present an experiment designed to study the reference effect on 
a question of major importance in financial markets: credit screening.  A key 
characteristic of credit —and insurance— markets is information asymmetry.  
To combat its problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, banks and 
insurance companies can use screening.  That is, they can offer the clients a 
menu of contracts and infer their characteristics from their choices.  If the 
pattern of choices that individuals with different characteristics, as risk level, 
make when facing a menu of contracts differs, then there is self-selection of 
clients and screening occurs.  The possibility of screening borrowers by their 
risk level is of great importance.  When lenders offer a menu of contracts 
inducing the self-selection of firms, there is a separating equilibrium that reveals 
information and can resolve rationing.  Hence, the monetary policies by Central 
Banks can be improved. 
Among the extant screening mechanisms, lenders may employ collateral 
requirements along with the interest rate
2
.  Bester (1985) shows that applicants 
with lower-risk projects are willing to accept higher collateral at a lower 
premium, while those with higher-risk projects select unsecured loans at a 
higher premium. 
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 The empirical/experimental literature on reference-dependant individual decision-making is 
too large to be cited here.  See Camerer (1995) and Sudgen (1999) for insightful surveys. 
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 See Bester (1985), Chan & Kanatas (1985), Besanko & Thakor (1987), Chan & Thakor 





Our experiment aims to answer an essential question for such settings: Does the 
framing of the offered menu of contracts interfere with the self-selection of 
clients?  The answer is yes.  In fact, subjects’ choices shift when the same 
(positive) outcomes of the same menu of contracts are presented in two different 
frames.  Since both frames differ only in the ―perceived‖ reference point, we 
propose a theoretical approach that initially follows Prospect Theory to explain 
our results. 
An important feature of Prospect Theory and other reference-dependant 
approaches is the behavioral assumption that postulates that individuals 
overvalue what is lost from their reference viewpoint (loss aversion).  If 
individuals perceive the collateral contract terms as a possible loss, it may imply 
that individuals value the collateral more than Bester’s theory predicts.  As a 
result, applicants with lower-risk projects may not be willing to accept higher 
collateral at a lower premium to self-select, and the screening mechanism may 
fail. 
Our results show that subjects exhibit loss aversion in their perception and 
assessment of the positive outcomes under the reference point, and self-selection 
fails to occur.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that applies a 
reference-dependant approach to screening mechanisms. 
A few experimental papers have examined screening.  Shapira & Venezia 
(1999), Posey & Yavas (2007), and Kübler et al. (2008) have studied screening 
in the labor market and have focused on the principal’s behavior, not in the self-
selection mechanism.  Only Capra et al. (2009) have focused on the self-
selection mechanism.  Our experiment starts with the scenario proposed by 
Capra et al. (2009) and studies framing effects in the classic problem of credit 
screening. 
In the next section, the experiment is presented: the game theoretic prediction 
and hypotheses first and the experimental design and procedures afterwards.  In 
section 3, the results from the experiment are described.  Section 4 presents the 
theoretical approach that explains the results, and the final section summarizes 
the main conclusions. 
2. THE EXPERIMENT 
2.1. GAME-THEORETIC PREDICTION AND HYPOTHESES 
Our experimental design revolves around a principal-agent game that initially 
follows Bester’s (1985) model.  It considers a market with Ni agents, who can 
either be type i = a or b, according to their project risk level.  Each agent has the 
possibility of starting a project that requires an initial fixed investment I. 
3
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 Given that the required investment is fixed, it is not used as a way to signal information 
about the agent’s risk.  See Milde & Riley (1988) for models in which the investment is used 





 The return on the project for agent i is given by the random variable ~R i, with 0< 
~
R i < R i and a distribution function Fi(R) > 0 for all R > 0 .
4
  The agents (firms) 
have an initial wealth W<I, which together with a loan B = I-W finance the 
project.  Given the size of the loan, B, a credit contract  = (r, C) is specified by 
the interest rate r and the collateral C.  Firms may face collateralization costs 
assumed to be proportional to the amount of collateral.  When C > (1+r)B, the 
firm would not admit project failure.  Therefore, only contracts with C < (1+r)B 
are considered.  It is assumed that firm i’s project fails if C+Ri < (1+r)B, and 
this becomes observable only after a firm declares project failure.  If this 
happens, the bank becomes the owner of both the investment project and its 
return.  Thus, the expected profit of the project for firm i and a credit contract  
is given by:  
i() = E{max [
~
R i - (1+r) B - kC, -(1+k) C]}   [1] 
Banks cannot distinguish borrowers by risk; however, they can separate them by 
offering a pair of contracts (, ) that are incentive compatible and act as self-
selecting mechanisms.  The pair (, ) is incentive compatible if: 
a() > a(); b() > b()    [2] 
As long as a pair of contracts (, ) is offered, the firm prefers the contract that 
maximizes its expected profits.  Thus, if preferences of investors depend 
systematically on their types, banks can utilize a menu of contracts with 
different collateral requirements as self-selection mechanisms.  Bester (1985) 
concludes that the low risk loan applicants try to differentiate themselves from 
high risk applicants by accepting higher collateral for a given reduction in 
interest rates, as collateral is costly.  
 








The isoprofit curves for the two types of loan applicants are depicted in Figure 
1.  Applicant b’s isoprofit curve has a steeper slope than applicant a’s, because the 
first’s project is riskier and, by stochastic dominance of second degree, profits are 
a convex function of the realized returns (R).  This means that type a firms are 
inclined to accept a higher increment in collateral for a given reduction in 
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 This condition ensures that there is a positive probability of failure as long as the interest 





interest rates than type b firms.  This fact allows self-selection of agent’s types 




However, under Prospect Theory and other reference-dependant approaches, 
individuals overvalue what is lost from their reference viewpoint.  These 
behavioral approaches are strongly at odds with traditional economic 
approaches, as Bester’s, according to which framing should not affect valuations 
of the collateral. 
We use experimental methods to analyze agents’ self-selection under two 
different frames (both positive).  The aim of the paper is to test the screening 
power of co-payment devices.  As in the theoretical models of credit screening, 
we design ad hoc incentive compatible contracts to test the following 
hypotheses. 
H1: Contracts combining pairs of collateral and price screen agents with 
different risk levels. 
H2: Framing affects the valuation of collateral and interferes with the 
screening mechanism. 
2.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
An environment was designed in which there were N subjects that needed 
money to develop a project with some expected future return.  Each subject had 
the two types of projects i = s (safer: 90% prob. success), r (riskier: 50% prob. 
success).  They played 10 rounds with the safer project and 10 rounds with the 
riskier project in each treatment.  We offered a menu of two contracts each 
round.  Each contract included two features: the price to be paid and a deposit, 
representing the collateral. 
We run two treatments, A and B, one with broken down payments.  In order to 
control for individual differences in personality or risk attitude, all subjects play 
the two treatments (within subject treatments).  Half of the subjects played 




There is only one difference between the two Treatments: The payoffs’ framing 
(See Figures 2 and 3).  Treatment A (Figure 2) shows, in this example, a payoff 
of 725 units for contract A when the project succeeds, whereas Treatment B 
(Figure 3) shows a payoff of 300+425 (that equals 725).  Similarly, Treatment A 
(Figure 2) shows a payoff of 75 units for contract A when the project fails, 
whereas Treatment B (Figure 3) shows a payoff of 300-225 (that equals 75). 
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 In Bester (1985), self-selection resulted from stronger assumptions than in Stiglitz & Weiss 
(1981).  To produce a separating equilibrium the additional assumption that Fi(R) > 0 for all R 
> 0 is needed.  With this assumption, it is possible to have a monotonous relationship between 
risk and applicants’ preferences. 
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In this experimental market, each individual started each round with an initial 
wealth of 300 units.  Each subject had to choose one or none of the two offered 
contracts in each round.  The subjects who do not choose any contract in the 
round receive a return of 30 monetary units.  The individuals expected returns 
for investing in the project were:  
ERs = 0.9 (300 + 600 – Price) + 0.1 (300 + 0 – Deposit) [3] 
ERr = 0.5 (300 + 1080 – Price) + 0.5 (300 + 0 – Deposit) [4] 
In each of the rounds, we offered a pair of theoretically incentive compatible 
contracts (C1, C2) with: ERs (C2) ≥ ERs (C1) and ERr (C1) ≥ ERr (C2) 
Table 1 shows the 5 pairs of contracts offered to the subjects and Figure 4 
illustrates the iso-profit curves designed with the 5 pairs of offered contracts.  
The pairs of theoretically incentive-compatible contracts applied here are the 
ones used originally by Capra et al. (2009).  In the Capra et al. (2009)’s paper 





borrowers characterized by different risk-levels.  In our experiment, each pair of 
contracts was shown in two different rounds, in order to counterbalance the side 
(left, right) and colors (blue and yellow) of the contracts in each pair.  The 
experiment was programmed and run in E-prime for these graphical reasons. 
 
Table 1: Pairs of Offered Contracts 
Pair Contract 1  Contract 2  
 Price Dep. Price Dep. 
1 360 0 166 300 
2 335 25 169 275 
3 310 50 172 250 
4 285 75 175 225 
5 260 100 177 200 
 
Figure 4. Designed Contracts’ Isoprofit Curves 
 
 
The design of the experiment controls for the order of treatments, the 
presentation (right/left; blue/yellow colors), and allows for indifference: We ask 
two times the same choice (an indifferent participant may choose contract 1 
once, and contract 2 once). 
The 47 subjects of the experiment were students from the University of Geneva 
(Switzerland) recruited from various courses and grades using flyers (23 males, 
24 females).  During the experiment, they were not allowed to communicate 
with the rest of the participants.  The individuals read the instructions and we 
answered their questions.  During the experiment the subjects received no 
feedback.  At the end of the game, they received their gains (around 17 CHF 
each
7
).  Each session lasted for one hour and 15 minutes and was run either at 
the laboratory of the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences or at the laboratory of 
the Faculty of Psychology, both at the University of Geneva. 
 
                                                          
7
 Subjects were paid on the basis of their decisions. Four trials drawn at random were paid, 
one from the low risk and one from the high risk project, both in treatment A and in treatment 
B. 
 





















The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 5.  There 
are a total of 470 observations per Treatment.  Treatment A (hereby Framing 1) 
differs from Treatment B (hereby Framing 2) only in the outcomes’ 
presentation. 
In Framing 1, as predicted by Bester’s model, subjects with riskier project 
mostly choose the low collateral contract (58.94%).  The Wilcoxon test shows 
that the difference between low collateral and high collateral contract choices is 
significant at 1% level (p=0.01).  By contrast, when the same subjects have the 
safer project, they prefer (55.32%) the contract with the higher collateral 
(p=0.08).  Our results confirm that Framing 1 allows the subjects to self-select 
and, therefore, screening occurs
8
.  H1 is confirmed in Framing 1. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive and Test Statistics by Framing and Project 
 Framing 1 Framing 2 
 Riskier Project Safer Project Riskier Project Safer Project 
 Obs % Obs. % Obs % Obs % 
Lowcoll (LC) 277 58.94% 183 38.94% 338 71.91% 211 44.89% 
Highcoll (HC) 151 32.13% 260 55.32% 96 20.43% 232 49.36% 
None (NC) 42 8.94% 27 5.74% 36 7.66% 27 5.74% 
     
Wilcoxon Test  Riskier Project  Safer Project 
  Framing 1  Framing 2  Framing 1  Framing 2 
Lowcoll-Highcoll p = 0.01  p = 0.00  p = 0.08  p = 0.71 
Lowcoll-None p = 0.00   p = 0.00   p = 0.00   p = 0.00 
Highcoll-None p = 0.00   p = 0.03  p = 0.00   p = 0.00 
Lowcoll  p = 0.01    p = 0.20  
Highcoll  p = 0.01    p = 0.32  
None  P = 0.43    P = 0.62  
 
In Framing 2, the percentage of choices of the low collateral contract rises in 
both projects, and screening fails to occur (71.91% choices for riskier projects, 
and 44.89% choices for safer projects —although the increase in choices for 
safer projects is not statistically significant, p=0.20).  This result supports H2.  
Subjects perceiving they may ―lose‖ the initial wealth (remember Figure 3; 
subjects see, for example: 300+425, 300-225), avoid high collateral contract 
choices.  Table 2 shows that, in framing 2, there is no self-selection.  When 
subjects have the safer project, the difference between low collateral contract 
choices (44.89%) and high collateral contract choices (49.36%) is not significant 
(p=0.71). 
Figure 5 shows the histograms of these results by framing and project type. 
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Most of the subjects with the safer project choose, in the Framing 1, the high 
collateral contract, whereas in Framing 2, the same subjects modify their 
choices and reduce their choices of high collateral contract.  Therefore, 
Framing 2 interferes with self-selection and screening fails to occur. 
 
Figure 5. Histogram by Framing and Project
 
We run a (panel) logistic model to confirm that self-selection is influenced by 
framing, as descriptive statistics show.  Table 3 displays the results of the 
logistic analysis. 
Table 3. Logit model 
Prob. of Low 
Collateral  
dy/dx  Std. Errors  
 F1*Safer    -0.09          0.05*  
 F2*Safer    -0.01  0.04  
 F1*Risker    0.18  0.03***  
 F2*Risker    0.32  0.02***  
     
 Number of obs.       =  1748                              Wald    =  166.82 
 Number of groups    =    47                                   Prob. >       =    0.00 
 Obs per group:  min =    22  
Marginal effects after Random-effects logit regression. *, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence 






















Riskier Project Safer Project Riskier Project Safer Project
LC HC NC LC HC NC LC HC NC LC HC NC












As expected, in both frames, the probability of choosing the low collateral 
contract increases when subjects have a riskier project (F1*Risker and 
F2*Risker variables).  On the other hand, when subjects have the safer project, 
they prefer the high collateral contract in Framing 1 (see the negative sign in 
F1*Safer).  However, having the safer project in Framing 2 does not play any 
significant role in subjects’ choices (F2*Safer). 
The results clearly support H1 (Contracts combining pairs of collateral and 
price screen agents with different risk levels) for Framing 1.  Nevertheless, by 
presenting the outcomes in a slightly different way in Framing 2, the results 
confirm H2 (Framing affects the valuation of collateral and interfere the 
screening mechanism). 
4. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS 
Given that Framing 1 and Framing 2 differ only in terms of the ―perceived‖ 
initial position, it seems natural to use a reference-dependant approach to 
explain our results. 
In this section we use our experimental data to estimate the reference-dependant 
parameters.  We propose, following Barreda-Tarazona et al. (2010), the 
specification typically used for cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) without its characteristic probability weighting functions, 
removed for simplicity.  This specification could also be viewed as a reference-
dependant Expected Utility representation. 
We estimate maximum likelihood models of value function using a structural 
model of binary choice, following Harrison and Rutström (2008).  We assume 
that the value function        is defined by: 
         
              
          
         
         
  [5] 
Where   is the reference point,    is the specific outcome, α is the parameter 
indicating the curvature of the value function,  and   is the loss aversion 
parameter (normally above 1). 
In particular, our model is defined by: 
  = 300; the initial wealth. 





                                         
                                    
                                          
                                         
  
Under the reference-dependant value (RDV), the value associated with a lottery 
  satisfies: 
                  
 





We estimate the models using the clustering method that allows for within-
subjects choices’ correlation.  Table 4 shows the estimated parameters and 
Figure 6 depicts the resulted functions. 
The estimated α parameter, α=0.26, shows risk aversion.  Interestingly, the 
estimated α do not differ significantly between Faming 1 and Faming 2 (p-
value= 0.95).  As expected, above the initial wealth (300), subjects’ choices are 
similar for Framing 1 and 2 (see Figure 6). 
 
Table 4. Estimated Reference-Dependant Parameters 
  Framing 1 Framing 2 
  Coefficient Std. Errors Coefficient Std. Errors 
α  0.26 0.04*** 0.26 0.03*** 
λ  0.61 0.22*** 1.28 0.29*** 
      
 Number of obs. = 871   Number of obs. = 877 
   
             p-value= 0.95   
             p-value= 0.03   
Standard Errors adjusted for 47 clusters in subject. *** significant at 1% confidence level.  
 
Figure 6.  Estimated Reference-Dependant Parameters 
 
However, bellow the ―perceived‖ reference point of 300, the same subjects 
facing the same menus of contracts make different decisions in Framing 1 and 
















 (see Figures 2 and 3).  The estimated λ parameter is 
significantly different in Framing 1 and 2, p-value= 0.03.  In Framing 2, the λ>1 
shows loss aversion.  Subjects perceive the outcomes below 300 (for example, 
300-225 in Figure 3) as a loss, and loss aversion is elicited.  No loss aversion is 
elicited by Framing 1, λ<1, were the outcomes are shown in absolute values (for 
example, 75 in Figure 2). 
An essential feature of Prospect Theory is that the carriers of value are gains and 
losses rather than the final outcome (i.e. gains and perceived losses, in our 
experiment).  Loss aversion is the behavioral assumption that postulates that 
individuals, from their reference viewpoint, value losses more than gains.  This 
implies, as shown in Figure 6, that the perception of a potential loss generated 
by the collateral contract terms makes subjects overweight this contract 
component.  In Framing 2 subjects perceive that they are already enjoying a 
good (the initial wealth), and realize that with some probability they can lose 
this existing good (collateral)
10
.  Loss aversion interferes with the self-selection 
of subjects in Framing 2, and the screening mechanism fails. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Inspired by the reference-dependant approaches, and most prominently by the 
seminal works of Kahnemann and Tversky and their Prospect Theory, we have 
conducted an experiment to study framing effects in the classic problem of 
credit screening, a problem with important economic and policy implications. 
Extant theories on credit screening assume that borrower’ preferences among 
different combinations of interest and collateral systematically depend on their 
risk levels.  However, these models so far, have not addressed an important 
question for such settings: Does the framing of the offered menu of contracts 
interfere with the self-selection of clients?  We have found that framing affects 
the valuation of collateral and interferes with the screening mechanism.  In fact, 
subjects’ choices shift when the same (positive) outcomes of the same menu of 
contracts are presented in two different frames. 
Since both frames differ only in the perceived reference point, we use a 
reference-dependant approach that initially follows Prospect Theory to explain 
our results.  This approach takes explicitly into account that individuals, from 
their reference viewpoint, value losses more than gains.  In fact, our results show 
that the ―loss perception‖ generated by the collateral contract terms makes 
subjects overvalue this contract component.  Subjects exhibit loss aversion in 
their perception and assessment of the collateral —although framed as a positive 
outcome under the reference point—, and self-selection fails to occur. 
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 Both Framings even share exactly the same instructions. 
10
 In the same line, Georgantzís & Navarro-Martínez (2010), in their paper on psychological 
processes behind the endowment effect, find that two different phases contribute to the 
endowment effect: (1) a first phase of enhancement of subject’s positive feelings produced by 





Our result emphasizes the need to account for the frames of reference under 
which evaluations of probabilistic information take place.  In general, principal-
agent games and the theoretical models on financial markets should take into 
account the reference points (and the related concept of endowment effect). 
This finding can be used to explain the mixed empirical results reported in the 
literature on the relationship between collateral and borrower risk
11
.  Banks —
and more generally principals— should consider framing and the agents’ 
reference point when offering a menu of alternatives. 
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